THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT
168
FAR EASTERN (JAPAN).
CONFIDENTIAL.
[F 4055/456/23]
April 27, 1939.
SECTION 1.
Copy No. 061
Viscount Halifax to Sir R. Craigie (Tokyo).
(No. 301.) Sir,
Foreign Office, April 27, 1939. AT my request the Japanese Ambassador called this afternoon, when I told his Excellency that there was a point about which I wished to speak to him. The matter had some urgency in view of information which had reached me on the subject.
2. I said to the Ambassador that I understood from you in Tokyo that anxiety had been aroused in Japan by suggestions in the press that in the conversations which we were now carrying on with the Soviet Govern- ment there was the idea that any arrangements which might be come to with the Soviet should be applicable to and cover the Far East as well. I wished to tell his Excellency myself that nothing of this sort had been done and that there had been no suggestion from our or the Russian side that anything of the sort should be done. I went on to say that if our relations with Japan developed as I hoped they might, and as we both hoped to improve them, there would be no question of extending the conversations to the Far East. I wished to explain this to the Ambassador in case there was any anxiety on the point in quarters more important than the press. His Majesty's Government in these critical days wished to avoid any difficulties that were not inevitable.
3.
The Ambassador thanked me cordially for the explanation which I had given him, which he thought might have a good effect in Japan. He asked if I could tell him what was going on in regard to Russia. Russia, his Excellency said, lay half-way between the Far East and Europe and was very much interested in what went on in both hemispheres. Russia was also much mixed up in Chinese affairs and for this reason he would be glad to receive some information on the conversations which I had mentioned.
4. I replied that we did well to distinguish between Far Eastern and European problems. We had given certain undertakings in Europe to resist aggression, particularly with regard to Poland and Roumania. In desiring to resist aggression, it was important to make the opposing forces as strong as possible. It was therefore very desirable that Russia should assist to that end. On the other hand, the position of Poland and Roumania between two powerful neighbours was difficult and delicate, and it had not been in general conformity with their policy hitherto to lean to one side or the other. We had consequently been seeking a policy which would, on the one hand, not deprive the forces of resistance to aggression of Russian help, and, on the other hand, not prejudice the position of the countries in question and not give Germany an excuse to say that we were following a policy of encirclement. We had to be careful not to arouse suspicion in quarters which were suspicious of Russian ideas and not to force Russian help where it was not wanted. I had had conversations with the Russian Ambassador here and also with the Roumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs during the latter's recent visit, while interchanges of view had also taken place with M. Litvinov.
5. Mr. Shigemitsu asked if we had come to definite conclusions in our talks with Russia, and I replied that we had arrived at certain views, but were now The discussing in what manner we could best give expression to them. Ambassador referred to press reports of a military alliance with Russia, to which I replied that military arrangements were certainly not excluded, but that at present no such conclusions had been reached.
6. The Ambassador said that he personally was rather unhappy that His Majesty's Government needed to call in the help of Russia, especially in a military sense. His Excellency said that I might remember that when the Franco-Soviet Pact was concluded, the French Government had informed the Japanese Govern- ment that the pact did not cover the Far East, and his Government had accepted
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